Crypto-finance not only reproduced old methods of market abuse (e.g. simple fraud, “pump and dump” schemes), but also created opportunities for novel kinds of potentially abusive behavior. We investigate which behaviors (e.g. types of “MEV”) should be considered as abusive and how the regulators should respond.
“Infrastructural” participants of blockchain networks (e.g., miners, validators, and node operators) have varying degrees of freedom in performing their functions. They make choices for which they could be legally liable. Our focus is on the question what kind of legal liability is and should be attached to such network participants?
The purpose of this project is to research how the law (especially EU law) should understand transaction execution and transaction (settlement) finality on Ethereum.
Legally required financial surveillance is often in tension with the fundamental right to privacy. This is especially true in crypto-finance, where the problem is amplified by transparency of public blockchains. We explore the tension between privacy rights and law enforcement.
It is often argued that at least some transparency-oriented regulatory tools used in “traditional finance” are not needed in DeFi, because DeFi is by design much more transparent, especially on Ethereum. This is likely true to some extent, but not enough attention has been devoted so far to investigating both the promise and the limitations of this approach.
